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COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT: SMALL BOOTHS LEAD
TO BIG TROUBLE FOR VIDEO STORES
Technological advancements and human ingenuity have always
gone hand in hand. It is not surprising, then, that enterprising individu-
als have sought, and will continue to seek, to utilize new technologies in
innovative ways to derive revenue from the exhibition of copyrighted
materials. In Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc.,, the
Third Circuit held that exhibiting videocassettes of copyrighted films for
a fee in private viewing booths constituted public performances which
infringed on the copyright holders' exclusive rights.2 The impact of such
a decision cannot be treated lightly. This ruling informs all would-be
entrepreneurs that they are not immune from liability for copyright in-
fringement simply because the technologies are of recent origin or are
being applied in innovative ways.3 The existing statutory framework will
protect the exclusive rights of a copyright holder.4
The copyright infringement issue in Redd Home arose out of a
showcasing or in-store rental concept. Maxwell's Video Showcase, Ltd.
("Maxwell's"), operated two facilities in Erie, Pennsylvania, where it
rented and sold videocassette recorders, prerecorded videocassettes and
blank cassettes. Each store contained a showroom area in the front, and
a showcase or exhibition area in the rear. The front showrooms con-
tained materials for sale and rent, as well as dispensing machines for pop-
corn and beverages. The rear showcase areas contained small, carpeted
private booths where two to four patrons could view videocassettes on a
nineteen-inch color television. There were a total of eighty-five booths in
the two stores.
In order to use a viewing booth, the customers would select a video-
cassette of a film from Maxwell's catalogue. The fee charged would de-
pend on the number of people in the viewing room and the time of day.5
1. 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
2. Id. at 162. The plaintiffs, motion picture producers, distributors and copyright holders
of the motion pictures exhibited at Maxwell's consisted of the following companies: Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc., Embassy Pictures, Paramount Pictures Corp., Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp., Universal City Studios, Inc., Walt Disney Productions and Warner Bros.,
Inc. The defendants were: Maxwell's Video Showcase, Ltd., Redd Home, Inc. (Maxwell's
advertising and public relations firm), Robert Zeny (the president and sole shareholder of
Maxwell's), and Glenn W. Zeny (Robert's brother and president of Redd Home, Inc.).
3. Id. at 157.
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1977), reprinted infra note 11.
5. The price was five dollars for one or two people before 6 p.m., and six dollars for two
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
The fee additionally entitled patrons to help themselves to popcorn and
beverages. Closing the door to the room would signal a Maxwell em-
ployee to place a cassette of the film chosen by the viewer into a videocas-
sette machine in the front of the store. The picture would then be shown
in the patron's viewing room.
Any member of the public who wished to use Maxwell's facilities
and services was welcome to do so. However, access to each room was
limited to the individuals who rented it as a group. Strangers were never
placed in a viewing room in order to fill the room to capacity.
Maxwell's advertised on Erie radio stations and in theater pages of
local newspapers. Typically, each advertisement featured one or more
motion pictures, and emphasized Maxwell's selection of films, low prices
and free refreshments. However, these advertisements did not state that
the motion pictures were videocassette tapes shown on television
monitors. At the entrance of each Maxwell's facility, there were also
advertisements which resembled movie posters. Additionally, movie pos-
ters were displayed in the front area of each store.
Columbia Pictures Industries ("Columbia") brought suit against the
alleged copyright infringement resulting from Maxwell's in-store rental
operation.6 Columbia claimed that the exhibition of the videocassettes in
the private booths constituted unauthorized public performances, violat-
ing its exclusive rights under the Copyright Act of 1976 ("Act").7 Co-
lumbia moved for summary judgment and sought an injunction, to
prevent Maxwell's from exhibiting the motion pictures.'
The United States District Court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania granted summary judgment 9 in favor of Columbia, and dis-
missed Maxwell's various counterclaims.'" The district court first found
that a grant of distribution in a particular videotape of a movie did not
act as a waiver of any other exclusive rights under the copyright law.'"
According to section 202 of the Act, one may own a copy of another's
people after 6 p.m. At all times, there was a one dollar charge for the third and fourth persons.
Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 157.
6. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 494, 495-96
(W.D. Pa. 1983).
7. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et. seq. (1977).
8. Redd Home, 568 F. Supp. at 497.
9. Id. at 497.
10. Id. at 501-02. Maxwell's presented four counterclaims which stated that Columbia: (l)
brought the action to drive Maxwell's out of the showcasing market and to reserve the market
solely for itself, (2) used unlawful tying arrangements, violating antitrust laws; (3) maliciously
interfered with Maxwell's business relationships; and (4) breached an implied contract of good
faith and fair dealing. Id. at 501.
11. Id. at 498.
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copyrighted work without acquiring any exclusive rights accompanying
the copyrighted material. 2 Moreover, section 106 of the Act enumerates
the exclusive rights owned by a copyright holder.' 3 Since the rights
granted by section 106 are separate and distinct, it followed that Colum-
bia's sales of its copyrighted motion pictures resulted in a waiver of its
exclusive rights to distribute those copies sold."' However, such sales did
not waive any of Columbia's other exclusive rights enumerated in section
106.'1 Thus, Columbia retained its exclusive right to perform its motion
pictures publicly, despite the sale of videocassette copies to Maxwell's.
The district court viewed Maxwell's showcasing operation as no dif-
ferent from the exhibition of films at a conventional movie theater. The
court stated that the viewing rooms more closely resembled "mini-movie
theaters than living rooms away from home."' 6 Like a movie theater,
Maxwell's was open to the general public and was limited to paying cus-
tomers. Seating in both facilities was of a finite number and the actual
performance of the motion pictures were handled by Maxwell's employ-
ees. 7 The district court thus found that Maxwell's audience was public
in nature and that showcasing Columbia's copyrighted motion pictures
resulted in repeated public performances which infringed Columbia's
12. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1977)). Section 202 of the Act states:
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.
Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy . ..in which the
work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work em-
bodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of ownership
of a copyright or any exclusive rights under a copyright convey property rights in
any material object.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1977) states:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of a copyright under this title has
exclusive rights to do and to authorize the following:
(1) to reproduce copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictoral, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a mo-
tion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted works publicly.
14. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1977) provides: "(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section
106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any
person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to
sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord." See Redd Home, 568
F. Supp. at 498.
15. Redd Horne, 568 F. Supp. at 498. See supra note 11.
16. Redd Home, 568 F. Supp. at 500.
17. Id.
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copyrights. "
The district court determined that Maxwell's showcasing operation
fell within the statutory definition of public performances found in sec-
tion 101 of the Copyright Act. 9 Under the second clause of that defini-
tion, to perform a work publicly means:
to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance . . . of
the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by
means of any device or process, whether the members of the
public capable of receiving the performance . . . receive it in
the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at
different times.2 °
Although the viewing rooms seated only four patrons at any one time,
the potential existed for a substantial portion of the public to attend such
performances over an extended period of time. Accordingly, Maxwell's
showcasing operation constituted infringing public performances.2 ' The
court, adopting Professor Nimmer's view of this portion of the defini-
tion,22 held that since Maxwell's facilities each had only one copy of a
given film title, the same copy must have been performed repeatedly,
constituting public performances.2 3 Finally, the district court concluded
that this portion of the definition of public performance was intended to
protect copyright owners from infringing performances such as those by
Maxwell's showcasing operation.2 4 Maxwell's appealed.
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's granting of a sum-
mary judgment and injunctive relief in favor of Columbia.2 5 The Third
Circuit first noted that this was not a case of unauthorized taping or
videocassette piracy, since Maxwell's legally obtained copies of the copy-
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977)).
21. Redd Home, 568 F. Supp. at 500.
22. Id. (citing 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.14(C)(3) (1985)). Professor
Nimmer cites a peepshow as an example where repeated performances of the same copy of the
material, before only one person at a time, results in numerous performances seen by the
public.
23. Redd Home, 568 F. Supp. at 501.
24. Id. The District Court additionally dismissed Maxwell's counterclaims regarding anti-
trust violations and tying arrangements, stating that groups with common business and eco-
nomic interests may jointly protect those interests from interference by competitors without
violating antitrust laws. Moreover, the counterclaim for malicious interference with Maxwell's
business relationships was also dismissed since no facts were presented to support that allega-
tion. Id.
25. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
The Third Circuit additionally discussed issues not addressed by the district court. See infra
note 58 for the Third Circuit's discussion of these issues.
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righted motion pictures by purchasing them either from Columbia or its
authorized distributors. 26 The court then recognized that it is the role of
Congress, and not the courts, to formulate new principles of copyright
law in response to technological innovations. 27 The court further stated
that Maxwell's was not immune from infringement simply because the
technologies were of recent origin or were being applied in innovative
uses.28 Although this case dealt with a novel application of relatively
recent technological developments, it still could be readily analyzed and
resolved within the statutory framework of the Copyright Act.29
Citing section 106 of the Act, which confers upon the copyright
owner certain enumerated and exclusive rights,3" the Third Circuit stated
that it was undisputed that Maxwell's was licensed to exercise the right
of distribution as governed by section 106(3),31 since a motion picture
copyright owner may dispose of a copy of his work, while retaining all
underlying copyrights which are not expressly or impliedly disposed of
with that copy.3 2 However, the rights protected in section 106 are sepa-
rate and distinct, and the granting of one does not waive any of the other
exclusive rights. Thus, Columbia's sales of videocassette copies of its
copyrighted motion pictures did not result in a waiver of any of the other
exclusive rights enumerated in section 106, such as the exclusive right to
perform its motion pictures publicly.33
The fundamental question addressed by the Third Circuit was
whether Maxwell's showcasing operation constituted a public perform-
ance of Columbia's motion pictures. According to section 101, "[t]o per-
form a work means. .., in the case of a motion picture or other audio
visual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds
accompanying it audible."34 Accordingly, Maxwell's showcasing opera-
tion constituted a performance since the playing of the videocassettes re-
sulted in a sequential showing of a motion picture's images and in
making sounds accompanying it audible.35
26. Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 157.
27. Id. "Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accom-
modate fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by
such new technology." Id. (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
431 (1984)).
28. Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 157.
29. Id. at 157-58.
30. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1977). See supra note 11.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1977).
32. Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 158 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 202). See supra note 10.
33. Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 158.
34. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977)).
35. Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 158.
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Addressing the question of whether Maxwell's showcasing opera-
tion constituted public performances, the court again cited section 101,
stating that "[t]o perform [a work 'publicly' means to perform] . it at
a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances
is gathered."'3 6 This section's legislative history indicates that the second
category, commonly referred to as a semipublic place (as determined by
the audience's size and composition), was designed to expand the public
performance concept by including those places that, although not open
to the public at large, were nonetheless accessible to a significant number
of people.37 "Clearly, if the place is public, the size and composition of
the audience is irrelevant."3 The Third Circuit, however, found it un-
necessary to examine the second part of the statutory definition because
it agreed with the district court's conclusion that Maxwell's was indeed
open to the public.39 Reiterating the district court's finding that the
showcasing operation was not distinguishable from the exhibition of films
at a conventional movie theater," the Third Circuit noted that the rele-
vant place within the meaning of section 101 was each of Maxwell's two
stores, and not each individual booth within each store.41 The fact that
the videocassettes could be viewed in private did not change the fact that
Maxwell's was unquestionably open to the public.42
The Third Circuit's conclusion that Maxwell's activities constituted
public performances is supported by subsection (2) of the statutory defi-
nition of public performance.43 The House Report accompanying the
36. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977)).
37. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 64, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5659, 5677-78. The House Report indicated that "[o]ne of the principal purposes
of the definition was to make clear that, contrary to the decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Distrib. Corp. v. Wyatt, 21 C.O. BULL. 203 (D. Md. 1932), performances in 'semipublic'
places such as clubs, lodges, factories, summer camps, and schools are 'public performances'
subject to copyright control." Id.
38. Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 158. This is illustrated by Professor Nimmer's peepshow
example. See supra note 20. While only one person at a time attends the performance, the
performance still occurs at a place open to the public. If the place is not public, however, the
size and composition of the audience will be determinative.
39. Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 159. The court noted that "[tihe statute is written in the
disjunctive and thus [either category] of places can satisfy the definition of 'to perform a work
publicly.' " Id. The fact that either category constitutes a public performance implies that in
order for Maxwell's not to have publicly performed the plaintiffs' movies, Maxwell's cannot be
a place open to the public and cannot be a place where a substantial number of persons outside
of a normal family circle and its social acquaintances would gather.
40. See supra text accompanying note 14.
41. Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 159.
42. Id.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) states, in pertinent part:
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Act, which explained that "a performance made available by transmis-
sion to the public at large is 'public' even though recipients are not gath-
ered in a single place,"" supports the court's conclusion. Thus, the
transmission of a performance to members of the public, even in private
settings such as Maxwell's viewing rooms, or hotel rooms, constitutes a
public performance.45 The fact that members of the public view the per-
formances at different times does not alter the legal consequences.
4 6
The court additionally looked to Professor Nimmer's examination
of this definition, where he stated that "[i]f the same copy. . of a given
work is repeatedly played (i.e. performed) by different members of the
public, albeit at different times, this constitutes a public performance."47
Finally, the court noted that Professor Nimmer seemed to have envi-
sioned the situation at Maxwell's when he wrote:
One may anticipate the possibility of theaters in which patrons
occupy separate screening rooms, for greater privacy, and in
order not to have to await a given hour for commencement of a
given film. These, too, should obviously be regarded as public
performances within the underlying rationale of the Copyright
Act.
48
Although Maxwell's had only one copy of each film, the repeated show-
ings of each copy to members of the public constituted public
performances.4 9
The Third Circuit additionally rejected Maxwell's contention that
its activities were protected by the first sale doctrine. The first sale doc-
trine is codified in section 109(a) of the Act,5 ° and in essence is an exten-
sion of the principle that ownership of the material object is distinct from
ownership of the copyrighted material.5 "The first sale doctrine pre-
vents the copyright owner from controlling the future transfer of a par-
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance. . . of the work to a place
specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether
the members of the public capable of receiving the performance... receive it in the
same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.
44. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 64-65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5659, 5678. The House Report further states that the same principles apply
whenever the potential recipients represent a limited segment of the public, such as the occu-
pants of hotel rooms.
45. Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 159.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing 2 M. NIMMER, § 8.14 (C)(3) at 8-142).
48. Id.
49. Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 159.
50. See supra note 12.
51. Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 159. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1977).
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ticular copy once its material ownership has been transferred." '52 It does
not, however, divest the owner of any of the other exclusive rights in the
work (including the right to authorize public performances) conferred
upon him or her by the other four subdivisions of section 106."3 Con-
versely, lawful acquisition of a copy does not convey to the purchaser any
of the rights reserved by the copyright owner.54 Thus, although a pur-
chaser of an authorized copy may rent that copy under section 109(a)
without violating the copyright owner's right of distribution under sec-
tion 106(3), he or she may not do so in ways that violate any of the
exclusive rights enumerated in section 106."5 Particularly, he or she may
not rent the copy for use in an infringing public performance.5 6
In Redd Home, only Columbia's distribution rights as to the trans-
ferred copies had been affected, and not its exclusive right to perform the
work publicly. 7 Therefore, the transfer of the videocassettes to Max-
well's did not result in a forfeiture or waiver of all of Columbia's exclu-
sive rights found in section 106.
Maxwell's first sale argument was merely another way of arguing
that its activities were not public performances. For this argument to
succeed, it would have been necessary to prove that the showcasing oper-
ation was, in actuality, truly an in-store rental.58 The facts, however,
showed otherwise. The showcasing operation was a significantly differ-
ent transaction than renting a tape for home use. Maxwell's maintained
physical control over the tapes, which were played by employees on
Maxwell's machines. Those tapes never left the store by sale, rental, or
any other means. According to the court, these facts clearly showed that
Maxwell's showcasing operation was a public performance which consti-
tuted copyright infringement of Columbia's motion pictures.5 9
52. Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 159. "The first sale doctrine provides that where a copyright
owner parts with title to a particular copy of his copyrighted work, he divests himself of his
exclusive right to vend that particular copy. While the proprietor's other copyright rights...
remain unimpaired, the exclusive right to vend the transferred copy rests with the vendee, who
is not restricted by statute from further transfers of that copy .. " United States v. Wise,
550 F.2d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977).
53. Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 160.
54. See also Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 315, 319
(M.D. Pa. 1985). See also 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1977).
55. Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 159-60.
56. Aveco, 612 F. Supp. at 319.
57. Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 160.
58. Id. For this to be the case, Maxwell's would have to sell, rent, or otherwise dispose of
the videocassettes.
59. Id. at 160. The remainder of the Third Circuit's decision discussed the liability of the
co-defendants and their antitrust counterclaims against Columbia. Regarding co-infringer lia-
bility, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to hold Glenn W. Zeny and Redd
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In analyzing the Redd Home decision, it is important to recognize
that this is a case of first impression-one with great implications. It is a
case involving an innovative use of the relatively new technology of vide-
ocassette machines. Such devices have had an important impact on mo-
tion picture producers, distributors and copyright holders. The
videocassette market has created an additional means of generating in-
come from motion pictures. However, it has also resulted in several law-
suits against those who have taken advantage of the availability of
videocassettes and have allegedly infringed on the copyright holders' ex-
clusive rights.6"
Prior to the age of videocassettes, it was relatively easy for motion
picture copyright holders to enforce and protect their exclusive rights.
There were two basic ways to obtain a copy of a copyrighted motion
picture: legally, through a sale, license, gift or loan from the copyright
holder;6 or illegally, by theft or piracy.62 However, videocassettes have
changed this situation. A motion picture copyright owner can no longer
trace copies of the copyrighted work. Today, anyone can own a copy of
a.copyrighted motion picture by purchasing it or by videotaping it off of
a television transmission.63 Moreover, the first sale doctrine allows one
who owns a copy of a copyrighted motion picture to sell or rent that
copy, so long as such sale or rental does not violate any of the copyright
owner's exclusive rights. 6' Therefore, since there are virtually millions of
legally obtained copies of copyrighted motion pictutes, it is extremely
difficult to find everyone who uses copies for infringing purposes. Thus,
the videocassette market, though economically beneficial to copyright
owners, may have opened up a myriad of new problems in the area of
copyright enforcement.
Finally, prior to videocassettes, copyright owners knew to whom
they sold, loaned, or licensed copies of their motion pictures; almost any-
one else with a copy was presumed to be an infringer.65 It was therefore
Horne, Inc. as contributory infringers since they knowingly participated in the infringing ac-
tivity and ignored requests from Columbia to cease and desist. Id. at 160-61. Regarding the
antitrust counterclaims against Columbia, the court found no allegations of fact to show a
violation of the antitrust laws. The Third Circuit then upheld the lower court's dismissal of
Maxwell's counterclaims. Id. at 161.
60. See Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 154; Aveco, 612 F. Supp. at 315.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1977). See supra note 10.
62. Anyone who knowingly violates the exclusive rights of a copyright owner is a copy-
right infringer. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1977).
63. For a detailed discussion regarding the legal rights involved in home videotaping, see
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1977).
65. See supra note 61.
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rarely necessary to resort to the courts to resolve these matters.66 Today,
however, these same copyright owners are now forced to resort to the
courts to protect their rights, especially regarding the public performance
of videocassettes.67
Although a district court in the Third Circuit subsequently followed
the Redd Home rationale in a case involving similar facts, 68 other courts
may not reach the same decision.69 What remains, then, is a relatively
undeveloped area of copyright law as a result of videocassette
technology.
The implications of the Redd Home decision can be seen more viv-
idly when they are extended to somewhat different circumstances. One
interesting scenario to consider: what result if Maxwell's were to provide
patrons with the videocassette and allow the customers to place it into a
videocassette player located inside the viewing booth, rather than having
an employee place the selected tape into the videocassette machine lo-
cated at the front of the store? 7° The threshold question is whether Max-
well's still would be performing the videocassettes. If this were
considered to be a performance, then it must be determined whether it
also would be a public performance.
Regarding the performance issue, as stated previously, "[t]o perform
a work means . . ., in the case of a motion picture . . ., to show its
images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audi-
ble."' 71 In our scenario, it could be argued that since Maxwell's employ-
ees would give the cassettes to the patrons, the patrons actually would be
performing the cassettes since they would be inserting the tapes into the
machines. Although this argument has merit, it fails to recognize that
such a performance would take place at Maxwell's. Undoubtedly, if the
66. It should be noted that while the copyright owners were (and are) predominantly mo-
tion picture producers and distributors who as an aggregate possessed enormous resources and
capital to protect their interests, the infringers often were small-scale, low-budget operations,
which usually were not willing or able to challenge such matters in court. Conversation with
Professor Lionel Sobel, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, Nov. 15, 1985.
67. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, No. 83-2594
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1985). This is an oral opinion. See infra note 78.
68. Aveco, 612 F. Supp. at 319. In this case, copyright holders in videocassette movies
(major motion picture producers and distributors in the United States) brought an infringe-
ment action against "Nickelodeon Video Showcase," claiming that the store was publicly per-
forming copyrighted videocassettes without a license. The district court, relying heavily upon
Redd Horne, held that the rental of videocassettes and rooms equipped with couches. television
sets and cassette players constituted unauthorized public performances of the copyrighted
works.
69. See infra note 78.
70. See Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Aveco, 612 F. Supp. 315 (M.D. Pa. 1985).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977).
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patron rented the tape and played it on a machine at home, then the
patron would be performing. However, although Maxwell's employee
would not be playing the cassette on the machine in this case, Maxwell's
would still exercise dominion and control over the tapes because the
tapes would not be allowed to leave the store.72 Therefore, according to
this analysis, since the patron would be inserting Maxwell's tape into
Maxwell's machine, which would then be viewed on Maxwell's premises,
Maxwell's would be the party performing the tapes.
The question of whether such a performance would be public can be
answered more readily. Section 101 states that a public performance oc-
curs when a work is performed "at a place open to the public or at a
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal family
circle and its social acquaintances is gathered."73 Thus, if the customer
performed the videocassette in the viewing booth, such a performance
theoretically might not be public. But if Maxwell's performed the tape,
Maxwell's would meet the first part of the statutory test for a public
performance since Maxwell's, the relevant place, is a public place.74
Therefore, even if Maxwell's employee were to allow patrons to place the
tape into the machine in the viewing booth, Maxwell's would still be pub-
licly performing the motion picture since the audience would be of a pub-
lic nature and since the movies would be shown on Maxwell's premises.
Another situation to consider is whether a hotel which provides
videocassette players in each guest's room, as well as a selection of tapes
from which to choose, would be publicly performing those tapes. The
analysis here would be the same as in the previous situation, where a
patron at Maxwell's would rent a tape and place it in the machine in the
viewing booth. For the same reasons, both would constitute perform-
ances by the proprietors.75 The more difficult issue is whether such a
performance in a hotel room would constitute a public performance. In-
terpreting the second definition of a public performance,76 occupants of a
hotel room appear to fall outside of the requirement of substantially
more than a circle of a family and its social acquaintances. However, the
72. Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 160. In the situation presented, it is presumed that Max-
well's does not rent the videocassettes for home viewing and that the cassettes do not leave the
store. Note that this scenario differs from that in Aveco, 612 F. Supp. at 315, where videocas-
settes were rented either for in-store or home viewing.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977).
74. Redd Home, 568 F. Supp. at 500.
75. The rationale is that, here, as at Maxwell's, the tape is being played or performed on
the proprietor's premises. The proprietor, therefore, is the one performing the work.
76. See supra text accompanying note 35. By the nature of its size and function, a hotel
room necessarily is limited to a small number of occupants. who, at least presumably, can be
considered social acquaintances.
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House Report accompanying the Act stated that "a performance made
available by transmission to the public at large is 'public' . . . . The
same principles apply whenever the potential recipients of the transmis-
sion represent a limited segment of the public, such as occupants of hotel
rooms."77 Arguably, then, the motion picture would be transmitted,78
and the legislative history indicates that hotel rooms should be consid-
ered public places, just as Maxwell's viewing rooms were held to be pub-
lic places.79 Therefore, the performing of a videocassette in a hotel room
could be a transmission to the public at large and thus constitute a public
performance under section 101(2).' °
Similarly, it should be noted that even if Maxwell's or a hotel did
not provide videotapes, unauthorized public performances might still oc-
cur, since the definition of a performance of a motion picture looks to the
playing or showing of the work,8" and not the work itself. Accordingly,
the activity of playing a videocassette in a sequential showing of the mo-
tion picture's images and in making the sounds accompanying it audible
would constitute a performance under section 101.82
A third situation to consider involves exhibiting videocassettes of
copyrighted motion pictures to prison inmates over television monitors
placed in viewing areas.8 3 There is no doubt that the showing of these
videocassettes by correctional authorities would constitute a performance
77. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 64-65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5659, 5678.
78. To transmit a performance is to communicate it by any device or process whereby
images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent. 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1977).
79. However, in a recent case, Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Professional Real
Estate Investors, No. 83-2594 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1985), where the hotel provides videodisc
players in its rooms and where guests could rent videodiscs from the front desk, the district
court reached the opposite conclusion from the Redd Home court. In an oral opinion, the
court held that since hotel rooms have traditionally been considered private under various
laws, including the fourth amendment, they were not public places. Specifically, tie court
stated that hotel rooms are private primarily because guests reaonably expect them to be pri-
vate. Additionally, the court distinguished this case from Redd Home on the grounds that the
sole purpose of renting a hotel room is not to view movies.
The court in Professional Real Estate implied that the relevant place (within the meaning
of a public performance as defined in § 101) was the individual hotel room and not the hotel in
its entirety. This, however, is contrary to the Third Circuit's holding in Redd Home, 749 F.2d
at 159, as well as to the legislative intent as found in the House Report. See supra note 76.
80. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977). See supra note 42.
81. Id.
82. Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 158.
83. In an analysis quite similar to that used by the Third Circuit in Redd Home, the
California Attorney General rendered an opinion that such an exhibition would constitute a
public performance. Infringement of Copyright, 65 Op. Att'y Gen. 106 (1982).
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of the copyrighted motion pictures within the meaning of section 101. 4
The key issue, then, is whether such a showing would constitute a public
performance. Although a prison is not open to the general public, it is
still a place where a substantial number of persons outside of a family
and its social acquaintainces is gathered.85 At the very least, a prison is a
semipublic place, and the legislative history of the Act indicates that per-
formance in semipublic places will constitute a public performance.86 At
the very most it is a public place. Either way, the result would constitute
a public performance. Finally, even if the inmates were to view the vide-
ocassettes in different viewing areas, the performances would still be pub-
lic due to the transmission of the motion pictures to the television
monitors.87
There are countless other situations where uncertainty exists as to
whether public performances have occurred. Among these are the exhib-
iting of motion pictures on airliners, in bars, restaurants, and hospital
rooms. Since the facts will differ in each case, it will be important to
consider the nature and composition of the audience and the type of es-
tablishment, as well as whether a transmission has occurred. However,
even after a thorough examination, it still may be difficult to determine
whether a public performance indeed has occurred.
By enacting the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress conferred upon
copyright holders certain exclusive rights to authorize public perform-
ances of their copyrighted works, 8 and to protect those works from be-
ing infringed. The Redd Home decision upholds these rights regarding
the unauthorized public performance of copyrighted motion pictures
and, in so doing, reinforces the purpose of the Act-to grant the work's
owner a "monopoly" in nearly every aspect of that work.
89
David M. Mittleman
84. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977). See supra text accompanying note 33.
85. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977). See supra text accompanying note 35.
86. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 64, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5659, 5677-78. Although the House Report makes no mention of prisons, such
institutions certainly appear to fall within the same classification as clubs, lodges, schools and
camps.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977). See supra note 77.
88. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1977).
89. The purpose of the Copyright Act is to protect the interests that authors have in their
artistic works by granting them legal monopolies in the performance of their copyrighted
works. Chess Music, Inc. v. Sipe, 442 F. Supp. 1184, 1185 (D. Minn. 1977). The purpose also
is to create incentives for creative effort. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
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